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Three Theories of “Principles of
Fundamental Justice”
Nader R. Hasan*

I. INTRODUCTION
No section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 has
generated more controversy than section 7. The open-textured rights
protected under section 7 — “life, liberty and security of the person” —
and their equally open-ended qualifier — the “principles of fundamental
justice” — have been a source of both optimism and confusion for litigants
and scholars alike.2 Even justices of the Supreme Court of Canada have
candidly admitted that the ambit of section 7 “remains difficult to
foresee”.3

*
The author is a partner at Ruby Shiller Chan Hasan, Barristers and an adjunct professor
at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. The author thanks Brendan Brammall, Jamie Cameron,
Gerald Chan and Penelope Ng for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of
this article. The author also thanks Cheryl McKinnon for her research assistance.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, s. 7 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See, e.g., Randal N.M. Graham, “Right Theory, Wrong Reasons: Dynamic Interpretation,
the Charter and ‘Fundamental Laws’” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 169 (examining the interpretive
theory used by courts in s. 7 cases); David Mullan, “Section 7 and Administrative Law Deference —
No Room at the Inn?” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 227 (critiquing the Supreme Court’s denial of the
relevance of administrative law principles to constitutional adjudication); Jamie Cameron, “Fault and
Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 553 [hereinafter
“Cameron”] (noting that the s. 7 jurisprudence “has become such an unwholesome jumble of tests
and doctrines”); Alana Klein, “Section 7 of the Charter and the Principled Assignment of Legislative
Jurisdiction” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 59 [hereinafter “Klein”] (urging an approach to s. 7 that
accounts for the respective institutional roles of courts and legislatures).
3
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 188 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Blencoe”].
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While the scope of the rights to “life, liberty and security of the person”
is far from settled,4 the principles of fundamental justice have proven to be
the more elusive concept.5 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,6 Lamer J.
began the Court’s ambitious project of giving life to the “principles of
fundamental justice” in a manner that was consistent with the Charter’s
transformative purpose. He eschewed the legislative history and originalist
doctrine, which supported a definition of fundamental justice that was
limited to procedural due process. He stressed that Canada had made a
democratic decision to give the courts more power, including the power of
constitutional judicial review.7 For the newly planted Charter to fulfil its
transformative purpose, section 7 must encompass both procedural and
substantive principles of fundamental justice.8
Justice Lamer went on to provide some guidance on section 7’s
qualifier — the “principles of fundamental justice”. The principles of
fundamental justice were to be section 7’s workhorse. Without that
qualifier, section 7 would guarantee an absolute right to be free from
government interference with life, liberty or security of the person. Justice
Lamer held that the principles of fundamental justice were “to be found in
the basic tenets of our legal system”.9 He did not, however, go on to define
the principles of fundamental justice. Nor did he tie the principles of
fundamental justice to any particular theory or judicial philosophy.
Justice Lamer’s ambitious vision for the principles of fundamental
justice provided an important building block for some of the most important and controversial decisions since the Charter’s adoption, including
the invalidation of Canada’s abortion scheme;10 the elimination of felony

4
See, e.g., Alan Young, “Deprivations of Liberty: The Impact of the Charter on
Substantive Criminal Law” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 73 (addressing whether the “right to liberty” in
s. 7 protects fundamental personal choices from state interference).
5
See, e.g., Mark Carter, “Fundamental Justice in Section 7 of the Charter: A Human Rights
Interpretation” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 243 (urging courts to adopt an understanding of “fundamental
justice” consistent with human rights theory); Peter W. Hogg, “The Brilliant Career of Section 7 of the
Charter” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 195 (overview of the history of s. 7) [hereinafter “Hogg”].
6
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 501-504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “MVR”].
7
Id., at 498-500.
8
Id., at 499 (noting that the Court’s task “is not to choose between substantive or
procedural content per se but to secure for persons ‘the full benefit of the Charter’s protection’ under
s. 7, while avoiding adjudication of the merits of public policy”) (citations omitted).
9
Id., at 503.
10
R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Morgentaler”].

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE

341

murder provisions of the Criminal Code;11 and the nullification of the
federal government’s decision to cancel a safe drug injection site.12
But in opening the section 7 principles of fundamental justice to
substantive judicial review, Lamer J. appeared to give little thought to
how Pandora’s Box might be closed. If the principles of fundamental
justice were to include substantive principles, what would be section 7’s
limits? How would these unwritten principles of fundamental justice be
identified? What purposes and principles should guide courts when they
are asked to recognize new principles of fundamental justice? Would
Canadian section 7 jurisprudence forever be mired in a U.S.-style debate
about the legitimacy of “substantive due process”?13
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has grappled with
these questions, and at various points, has adopted “frameworks” and
“tests” to limit the principles of fundamental justice. But it has never
identified a theory to explain the principles of fundamental justice.
Nevertheless, there is a sufficient body of jurisprudence to enable us to
identify three complementary (but conceptually distinct) theories, which
emerge implicitly from Supreme Court of Canada case law.
The first theory is historical: a principle of fundamental justice is a
legal principle that was historically protected or is deeply rooted in our
legal system’s history and traditions. The courts will recognize a
principle of fundamental justice if it can be anchored in a common law
legal principle or in norms enshrined in the post-Second World War
international human rights instruments that inspired the Charter’s
framers. Under this theory, the principal purpose of the section 7
principles of fundamental justice is to ensure that rights and principles do
not lose their protected status merely because they were not specifically
enumerated in the text of the Charter.
The second theory is derivative: it posits that the principles of
fundamental justice are to be found in the penumbra of section 7 and the
other “Legal Rights” protected under sections 8 to 14 of the Charter. This
theory recognizes that for the Charter to fulfil its transformative purpose,
11
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. See R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636
(S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.).
12
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”].
13
See Ryan C. Williams, “The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause” (2010)
120 Yale L.J. 408; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), at 18 (“[W]e apparently need periodic reminding
that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms — sort of like ‘green, pastel redness.’”).
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rights must not be frozen in 1982. Section 7 and sections 8 to 14 form an
interconnected web of rights, which are mutually reinforcing. A legal
principle is a principle of fundamental justice if it is necessary to give
meaning and effect to the other principles of fundamental justice in
sections 7 to 14 of the Charter. Under this theory, the principles of
fundamental justice serve to fill in the gaps left by the enumerated
principles of fundamental justice contained in sections 8 to 14 of the
Charter and the historically entrenched section 7 principles of fundamental
justice that have been “grandfathered” into section 7 by virtue of their preCharter status.
The third theory is evolutionary: even where a principle was neither
historically protected nor found within the penumbras of sections 7 to 14
of the Charter, the Court may recognize a principle of fundamental
justice where the right to life, liberty or security of the person outweighs
a competing governmental interest. Respect for human dignity and
autonomy are the animating principles. Under this theory, the principles
of fundamental justice protect an evolving set of national values that
command widespread contemporary support. Like the penumbra theory,
this category also recognizes that rights must not be frozen in 1982, but it
is broader and potentially more indeterminate. The courts have dealt with
this potential indeterminacy by creating “frameworks” and “tests” meant
to limit the ambit of the section 7 principles of fundamental justice.
Owing in part to these cumbersome tests, this third category over time
has coalesced around three principles of fundamental justice grounded in
the concept of proportionality — arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross
disproportionality.
These three theories of the principles of fundamental justice embody
variants of the Charter’s transformative purpose. Although none of the
three theories described in this paper can alone account for all of the
principles of fundamental justice that have been recognized since MVR,
together they account for most (if not all) of the disparate approaches to
the principles of fundamental justice in Supreme Court of Canada case
law. The seeds of all three theories can be found in MVR, but each has
developed separately.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed any of these
theories. They emerge only implicitly from the case law. The goal of this
paper is to render them explicit. This exercise is not merely academic.
By attempting to illuminate the reasoning behind these decisions, I hope
to identify lessons for future litigants seeking to assert their section 7
Charter rights.
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II. THE THREE THEORIES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
1. The Historical Principles of Fundamental Justice
In MVR, Lamer J. noted that the principles of fundamental justice
“are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system”.14 The “basic
tenets” are not defined, but Lamer J. wrote that many of these principles
of fundamental justice “have been developed over time as presumptions
at common law, [while] others have found expression in the international
conventions on human rights”.15 This language suggests that courts ought
to recognize a principle of fundamental justice if that principle was
previously acknowledged as fundamental to our legal system in the preCharter era. This theory of the principles of fundamental justice looks to
the past.
The historical approach posits that the principles of fundamental justice fulfil an overarching purpose of the Charter by ensuring that rights
and principles do not lose their protected status merely because they
were not specifically enumerated in the text of the Charter. At its broadest level, the purpose of the Charter was to transform Canada into a
constitutional democracy in which Government was constrained not only
by institutional structures, but also by the human and civil rights belonging to the people.16 Prior to the Charter’s adoption, individual rights and
liberties in Canada had been protected primarily under the common law.
But the common law is subservient to the will of the legislature, which
can narrow or altogether eliminate common law rights. Even a statutory
bill of rights lacks the gravitas and force of law to supplant the will of
the legislature, as our experience with the Canadian Bill of Rights
showed. 17 By contrast, a constitutional bill of rights “withdraw[s] certain

14

MVR, supra, note 6, at 503.
Id.
16
See Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Canadian Charter’s Transformative Aspirations” (2003)
19 S.C.L.R. (3d) 17, at 17-19; Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Postwar Paradigm and American
Exceptionalism” in Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 84; John D. Whyte, “The Charter at 30: A Reflection” (2012)
17 Rev. Const. Stud. 1, at 2.
17
Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. For
examples of the ineffectiveness of the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1978] S.C.J. No. 81, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (S.C.C.) (holding that the equality clause of the Bill of
Rights was not violated by the denial of benefits to women under the Unemployment Insurance Act
during pregnancy); Canada (Attorney General) v. Lavell, [1973] S.C.J. No. 128, [1974] S.C.R. 1349
(S.C.C.) (holding that provisions of the Indian Act that deprived Aboriginal women (but not
15
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subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy” and “place[s]
them beyond the reach of majorities”.18 Rights protected under the common law or statute are ephemeral; rights protected by a constitutionally
entrenched bill of rights are guaranteed.
The section 7 principles of fundamental justice are essential to the
Charter’s transformative purpose. A constitutional bill of rights like the
Charter involves the enumeration of specific rights. But a danger arises if
those specifically mentioned rights are taken as exhaustive instead of
illustrative. By enumerating rights in a constitutional bill of rights, we
risk obscuring or altogether eliminating those rights that existed at common law and thus stunting the “living tree” Constitution that the
Supreme Court has so diligently nurtured. The recognition of unenumerated principles of fundamental justice forecloses the application of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.19 The principles of fundamental justice incorporate into section 7 of the Charter those unwritten principles
that are fundamental to a free and democratic society. They thus serve to
ensure that the specific enumeration of fundamental rights and freedoms
does not leave Canadians less free than they were prior to the Charter’s
enactment. Under the historical approach, section 7 must incorporate
those principles that were fundamental to our legal system at the time of
the Charter’s adoption, but not necessarily any others.
(a) From MVR to Oickle and Latimer
Claims rooted in the historical principles of fundamental justice are
relatively straightforward for rights claimants. To establish a principle of
fundamental justice under this theory, one need only identify a historical
precedent. If there is an unbroken chain of rights protection reaching
back to our Nation’s pre-Charter history, that principle will be recognized
as a principle of fundamental justice. MVR was an easy case precisely
because the principle at issue — the requirement of mens rea as a
prerequisite for criminal liability — is firmly embedded in our Nation’s

Aboriginal men) of their status for marrying a non-Indian did not violate their right to “equality
before the law” under the Canadian Bill of Rights).
18
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, at 638 (1943),
per Jackson J.
19
“The express mention of one thing excludes all others.” See Turgeon v. Dominion Bank,
[1929] S.C.J. No. 56, [1930] S.C.R. 67, at 70-71 (S.C.C.); Ruth Sullivan, Construction of Statutes,
5th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008), at 251-52.
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legal history, traditions and jurisprudence.20 In MVR, British Columbia
had created an absolute liability offence for driving with a suspended
licence. The Crown needed only to establish proof of driving regardless
of whether the driver was aware of the suspension or not. This law
offended the principles of fundamental justice. Absolute liability — i.e.,
the complete absence of a guilty mind — offends the principle that the
morally innocent should not be punished. This principle, as Lamer J.
noted, “has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws”.21
With history as its arbiter, there was no need for the Court to go further
in its inquiry.
The “confessions rule” is another principle of fundamental justice
that the Supreme Court identified using the historical approach.22 In
Oickle,23 the Court traced the lineage of the confessions rule to a number
of pre-Charter common law decisions, relying, inter alia, on the Privy
Council’s 1914 holding in Ibrahim v. R. that “no statement by an accused
is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shewn by the
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has
not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of
advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority”.24 As the Court
noted in Oickle, the Supreme Court of Canada had adopted and
repeatedly re-affirmed the rule from Ibrahim in its pre-Charter
jurisprudence.25 The Court did not need to go further. The confessions
rule’s status as a pre-Charter fundamental principle had “grandfathered”
it into the section 7 principles of fundamental justice.
20
MVR, supra, note 6, at 514 (“Absolute liability in penal law offends the principles of
fundamental justice.”).
21
Id., at 513.
22
Although the Court in Oickle held that the confessions rule is still a “common law” rule
rather than a Charter right, commentators note that the Court has treated it as a principle of fundamental
justice protected by s. 7. See R. v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475, at para. 44
(S.C.C.) (holding that “Parliament could not make [an involuntary statement] admissible for any
purpose whatsoever without violating s. 7 of the Charter”); see also Hamish Stewart, Fundamental
Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 213
[hereinafter “Stewart”]. See contra Hon. Gary T. Trotter, “The Limits of Police Interrogation: The
Limits of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 293 (arguing that the common law confessions rule
continues to have relevance and that attempts to “Charter-ize” it may erode its protections).
23
R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Oickle”].
24
[1914] A.C. 599, at 609 (J.C.P.C.).
25
R. v. Prosko, [1922] S.C.J. No. 6, 63 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.); R. v. Boudreau, [1949]
S.C.J. No. 10, [1949] S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.); R. v. Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, [1956] S.C.R. 958 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55,
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.).
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Solicitor-client privilege is yet another principle of fundamental justice
that the Supreme Court derived from the historically based approach to the
principles of fundamental justice.26 The Court held that it is beyond dispute
that solicitor-client privilege existed and was jealously protected well
before the enactment of the Charter. This principle is among the “oldest of
the privileges”, having “roots in the 16th century”.27
The right to make full answer and defence is another example of a
principle of fundamental justice identified using the historical approach.
Although not specifically enumerated by the Charter, this right was
deemed protected by the principles of fundamental justice because of that
right’s pre-Charter common law status as “one of the pillars of criminal
justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the innocent are not
convicted”.28
Where a principle of fundamental justice has been anchored in
historical precedent, the Supreme Court has felt itself on surer footing
when granting a forceful remedy. In R. v. Latimer, a case in which the
accused was charged with murder for euthanizing his disabled daughter,
the Crown had interfered with jury selection by distributing
questionnaires to prospective jurors, asking them for their opinions about
various social issues, including euthanasia. Quoting from an oft-cited
English case, Lamer J. held that “[t]he interference contravened a
fundamental tenet of the criminal justice system, which Lord Hewart C.J.
put felicitously as ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done’”.29 The state’s interference with
prospective jurors offended this principle of fundamental justice. It was

26
R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at paras. 25-28 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “McClure”]. See also Canada v. Solosky, [1979] S.C.J. No. 130, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821,
at 833-36 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Solosky”]; Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 860, at 875 (S.C.C.); Smith v. Jones, [1999] S.C.J. No. 15, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, at paras. 44-50
(S.C.C.); Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, [2002] 3
S.C.R. 209, at paras. 18-19 (S.C.C.); Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2004]
S.C.J. No. 16, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, at paras. 16-17 (S.C.C.); Goodis v. Ontario (Ministry of
Correctional Services), [2006] S.C.J. No. 31, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 32, at paras. 15-17, 22-25 (S.C.C.);
Canada (Privacy Commissioner) v. Blood Tribe Department of Health, [2008] S.C.J. No. 45, [2008]
2 S.C.R. 574, at paras. 11, 16-17 (S.C.C.).
27
McClure, id., at para. 20.
28
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 336 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Stinchcombe”] (citing Dersch v. Canada (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 113, [1990]
2 S.C.R. 1505, at 1514 (S.C.C.)); R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at para. 98
(S.C.C.); McClure, id., at paras. 38-39.
29
R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) (quoting
R. v. Sussex Justices, [1923] All E.R. Rep. 233, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, at 259 (K.B.D.)).
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immaterial whether the state interference resulted in selecting jurors who
were actually biased or whether the ultimate fairness of the trial was
affected. The violation of the fundamental principle that “justice must be
seen to be done” demanded a new trial.
The combination of a violation of a historical principle of fundamental justice, coupled with a strong remedy, stands in contrast to other
cases, where the Court, despite recognizing a “new” principle of fundamental justice, will grant a lesser remedy. The Court in Oickle held that a
violation of the historical confessions rule “always warrants exclusion”
of evidence, whereas a violation of the related Charter right to silence
will justify exclusion of evidence only where its admission would “bring
the administration of justice into disrepute”.30
(b) The Limits of the Historical Approach
The historical approach to the principles of fundamental justice
answers Lamer J.’s critics who argue that his vision of section 7 is vague,
indeterminate and unprincipled.31 If the principles of fundamental justice
are rooted in historical precedent, then they are necessarily finite and
identifiable.
Yet, the historical approach is unsatisfactory as a generalized theory.
First, “[a]ll history becomes subjective”.32 It is also murky. While some
rights and principles can be neatly traced back to the Magna Carta, those
cases will be relatively rare. Solicitor-client privilege, for example, has a
venerable history, but for much of that history, it was a rule of evidence
rather than a substantive legal principle. Its elevation to fundamental
principle occurred much later.33
Further, to rely solely on the historical approach to the principles of
fundamental justice is to freeze section 7’s development in 1982: only
rights that already had been recognized as fundamental in the pre-Charter
era could receive section 7’s constitutional protection. This would be at
odds with the large, liberal and purposive approach to constitutional

30

Oickle, supra, note 23, at para. 30.
See, e.g., Jamie Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken
and the Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105 [hereinafter “Cameron, ‘From the MVR to
Chaoulli’”] (for criticism of indeterminacy of “MVR logic”); Cameron, supra, note 2, at 556.
32
Ralph Waldo Emerson, “History” in Essays (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1883), at 10.
33
Solosky, supra, note 26, at 834-35. See also Mahmud Jamal & Brian Morgan,
“The Constitutionalization of Solicitor-Client Privilege” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (3d) 213, at 214-29.
31
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interpretation that the Court has continually espoused.34 In MVR, Lamer J.,
despite stating that the principles of fundamental justice would be found in
our legal traditions, also cautioned that the interpretation of section 7 must
account for the “newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter”, which
should allow for the “possibility of growth and adjustment over time”, and
should not be stultified by “historical materials”.35
In addition, the historical approach does not explain many of the
principles of fundamental justice that have been recognized since MVR.
Many of the principles of fundamental justice that are discussed in the
next two sections are not anchored in historical precedent.
Indeed, some of the most firmly entrenched principles of fundamental
justice are not just unexplained by, but plainly inconsistent with, a
historical approach. For example, it is now well established that laws that
limit the right to life, liberty or security of the person and are “arbitrary”,
“overbroad” or “grossly disproportionate” will offend the principles of
fundamental justice.36 The very idea that laws could be judicially
reviewed on such grounds was anathema to Canada’s pre-Charter
Westminster system of government, where Parliament reigned supreme.
Prior to the Charter’s enactment, provided that government respected its
jurisdictional limits, there was nothing that prevented Parliament from
passing laws that were arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate in
relation to the liberty interests of the Canadian people. Whatever the
doctrinal rationale of substantive review of legislation on grounds of
disproportionality, it is not rooted in history. Thus, while the historical
approach is a useful theory to explain some principles of fundamental
justice, it does not and cannot account for all of them.
2. The Penumbra Theory of Principles of Fundamental Justice
The penumbra theory of the principles of fundamental justice justifies
the recognition of section 7 principles of fundamental justice that are not
firmly anchored in historical precedent. Under this approach, the
principles of fundamental justice protected by section 7 and the legal
rights enshrined in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter form an interconnected

34
35
36

Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155-56 (S.C.C.).
MVR, supra, note 6, at 509.
See infra, Part II.3(c).
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normative framework, which inform each other.37 The rights enumerated
under sections 8 to 14 of the Charter are illustrations of principles of
fundamental justice. The unwritten penumbra principles serve to fill in the
gaps left by the enumerated principles of fundamental justice contained in
sections 8 to 14 of the Charter and the historically entrenched section 7
principles of fundamental justice. In this way, the historical approach and
the penumbra theory are complementary. Under the penumbra theory,
principles that cannot be traced to history or the constitutional text may
nonetheless be worthy of protection as fundamental if they are necessary
to give established rights and principles meaning and effect.
The term “penumbra” is borrowed from U.S. constitutional law.38
In Griswold v. Connecticut,39 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a
constitutionally protected right to privacy.40 The right to privacy was not
specifically enumerated in the U.S. Bill of Rights, but Douglas J., writing
for the majority, held that the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance”.41 In essence, the enumerated rights have
penumbras that help protect the core. The Griswold decision formed the
intellectual bedrock for the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in
Roe v. Wade, where the Court ruled that the constitutional right to privacy
protected a woman’s right to have an abortion.42
In MVR, Lamer J. embraced the idea of a penumbra around section 7
and sections 8 to 14 of the Charter (although he did not use that terminology). He describes the formation of a penumbra emanating from
section 7 and sections 8 to 14 that fills in gaps left by the enumerated
rights. Justice Lamer noted that “ss. 8 to 14 provide an invaluable key to
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See Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 536 (S.C.C.),
per La Forest J. (“[T]he rights and freedoms protected by the Charter are not insular and discrete,
but are aimed rather at protecting a complex of interacting values, each more or less fundamental to
the free and democratic society that is Canada.”) (citations omitted).
38
I am mindful of Cardozo J.’s pointed warning that “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it”. Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry, 244 N.Y. 84, at 94 (1926), per Cardozo J.
39
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40
While Griswold is credited with popularizing the use of the penumbra metaphor, the
metaphor can be traced to an 1873 statement by Holmes J. See O.W. Holmes, “The Theory of Torts”
(1873) 7 Am. L. Rev. 652, at 654, reprinted in (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 773, at 775. See also Burr
Henly, “‘Penumbra’: The Roots of a Legal Metaphor” (1987-1988) 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 81, at 83-84.
41
Id.
42
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

350

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the meaning of ‘principles of fundamental justice’”.43 He further explained that:
Sections 8 to 14 are illustrative of deprivations of those rights to life,
liberty and security of the person in breach of the principles of
fundamental justice. For they, in effect, illustrate some of the
parameters of the “right” to life, liberty and security of the person; they
are examples of instances in which the “right” to life, liberty and
security of the person would be violated in a manner which is not in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. To put matters in
a different way, ss. 7 to 14 could have been fused into one section, with
inserted between the words of s. 7 and the rest of those sections the oft
utilized provision in our statutes, “and, without limiting the generality
of the foregoing (s. 7) the following shall be deemed to be in violation
of a person’s rights under this section”.44

Section 7 and sections 8 to 14 are conceptually “fused”. Each of the
enumerated rights informs the scope of the other. From these emanations,
new principles of fundamental justice emerge. But the emanations from
these penumbras are not unfettered. A principle will be recognized as a
principle of fundamental justice only if that new principle is necessary to
give existing rights and principles a full, meaningful and purposive
interpretation. The penumbra principles are thus “gap fillers”. They serve
to ensure that the state cannot undermine constitutional protections by
doing indirectly what is directly forbidden.
(a) The Growing Penumbra
The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Hebert exemplifies the
penumbra theory.45 In Hebert, the Court affirmed a robust pre-trial right to
silence under section 7. Hebert had been arrested and was in custody. He
had asserted his right to counsel and told the police that he did not wish to
make a statement. He was then put in a cell next to an undercover officer
posing as a suspect, who engaged the accused in conversation. The
accused made various incriminating statements, which he sought to
exclude on section 7 Charter grounds. However, the historical principles of
fundamental justice alone would not have afforded Hebert any relief. The
historical common law confessions rule set out in Ibrahim v. R. protects the
43
44
45

MVR, supra, note 6, at 503.
Id., at 502-503.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hebert”].

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE

351

accused from overt threats or inducements. The common law also afforded
the accused the right to remain silent.46 These historical common law
rights, however, did not on their own, protect the accused from the
deceptive police conduct at issue in Hebert.
But Hebert was protected by the section 7 penumbra. Justice
McLachlin (as she then was), writing for the majority, held that the
common law confessions rule and common law right to silence did not
exhaust the Charter’s protection because “[i]t would be wrong to assume
that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter are cast forever in
the straight-jacket of the law as it stood in 1982”.47 A principle of
fundamental justice “may be broader and more general than the particular
[pre-existing] rules which exemplify it”.48
Justice McLachlin thus looked to the penumbra: “[T]he right of a detained person to silence should be philosophically compatible with
related rights, such as the right against self-incrimination at trial and the
right to counsel.”49 The right against self-incrimination and the common
law confessions rule must be construed purposefully. Both were rooted in
an abhorrence of the old ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber,
which gave rise to the fundamental tenet that a citizen involved in the
criminal process must be afforded procedural protections against the
overweening power of the state.50 The right to counsel serves a complementary role, ensuring that the accused understands his right not to be
compelled to produce evidence against himself.51 These rights and principles are meant to give the accused a bona fide choice as to whether to
speak to the police.
For these rights and principles to be meaningful, the accused must be
afforded a robust right to silence. That right must be broad enough to
preclude attempts by the state to unreasonably leverage its superior
power to overwhelm the accused’s ability to choose whether to speak to
the police. Thus, the section 7 right to silence precludes the use of “tricks
which would effectively deprive the suspect of this choice [to remain
silent]”.52 Anything less would permit the police to do indirectly what the

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 682 (S.C.C.), per Lamer J.
Hebert, supra, note 45, at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id., at 173-74.
Id., at 176-77.
Id., at 180.
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Charter does not permit them to do directly and render the right to counsel and right against self-incrimination illusory.53
The penumbra of the pre-trial right to silence extends to a right to silence at trial and also limits the evidentiary use of the accused’s exercise
of his right to silence. As the Court noted in R. v. Chambers, the pre-trial
right to silence “would be an illusory right if the decision not to speak to
the police could be used by the Crown as evidence of guilt”.54 Hence, a
majority of the Court in R. v. Noble held that the Crown could not invite
the jury to infer guilt from the accused’s exercise of the right to silence.55
Justice Fish recently re-affirmed this right in R. v. Prokofiew.56 This line
of cases represents an aggressive yet principled expansion of the section 7
penumbra to ensure that the right to silence retains its meaningfulness at
all stages of the criminal prosecution. These rights are not specifically
enumerated in any constitutional text, but their protection was necessary
to protect “core” Charter rights.
Other important examples in the penumbra line of cases include
R. v. Pearson57 and R. v. Gardiner,58 which dealt with the penumbra of
the presumption of innocence at bail and at sentencing, respectively.59
The presumption of innocence is expressly enumerated in section 11(d)
of the Charter, which provides that “[a]ny person charged with an
offence has the right ... to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal”. A strict reading of section 11(d) would limit the
applicability of the presumption of innocence to trial. However, as
Dickson C.J.C. held in R. v. Oakes, a more general protection of the
presumption of innocence can be found within the penumbra of section 7
and section 11(d) of the Charter: “although protected expressly in
s. 11(d) of the Charter, the presumption of innocence is referable and

53

Id., at 180-81.
R. v. Chambers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 108, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1293, at 1316 (S.C.C.) (quoting
R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519, at 533 (S.C.C.)).
55
R. v. Noble, [1997] S.C.J. No. 40, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874 (S.C.C.).
56
[2012] S.C.J. No. 49, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 639, at paras. 64-66 (S.C.C.), per Fish J.,
dissenting on other grounds. The Prokofiew majority did not reconsider R. v. Noble despite having
been asked by the Crown to overturn it.
57
[1992] S.C.J. No. 99, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pearson”].
58
[1982] S.C.J. No. 71, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368 (S.C.C.).
59
Although Gardiner was a pre-Charter case, the rule from Gardiner arguably was
constitutionalized in R. v. Pearson.
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integral to the general protection of life, liberty and security of the
person contained in s. 7 of the Charter”.60
The corollary of the general right to be presumed innocent throughout
the criminal justice process is a corresponding requirement that the Crown
retain the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the
prosecution.61 Consequently, in R. v. Gardiner, the Supreme Court held
that because the sentencing process was the “ultimate jeopardy” to the
individual, the Crown should not be permitted to do through
the sentencing process what it was expressly forbidden from doing during
the trial. Thus, where the Crown seeks to advance aggravating facts at a
sentencing hearing, the Crown must establish those facts beyond a
reasonable doubt. This right of the accused to hold the Crown to a proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard at sentencing resides in the penumbra
of sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.
Similarly, in R. v. Pearson, the Court held that the presumption of innocence informed the meaning of the section 11(e) right to a reasonable
bail. Again, while the section 11(d) presumption of innocence did not on
its face appear to apply to bail hearings, the general section 7 right to be
presumed innocent informed the proper interpretation of section 11(e) of
the Charter.62 It is thus a principle of fundamental justice that an accused
shall be presumed innocent at her bail hearing.
The right to Crown disclosure can also be found in the penumbra of
section 7. In R. v. Stinchcombe, a unanimous Court noted that at common
law there was a duty on the Crown to “bring forward evidence of every
material fact known to the prosecution whether favourable to the accused
or otherwise”.63 That right, along with the common law right to make full
answer and defence, which had “acquired new vigour by virtue of its
inclusion in s. 7” of the Charter, underscored the need for a more robust
right to disclosure.64 The Crown’s obligation to disclose under the
Charter is thus broader than the duty that existed at common law, and
extends to all material in its possession relating to the investigation
against the accused unless it is clearly irrelevant or privileged.65 In R. v.
60

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 119 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Oakes”].
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Id., at 120.
Pearson, supra, note 57, at 688-89.
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Stinchcombe, supra, note 28, at 338 (quoting R. v. Lemay, [1951] S.C.J. No. 42, [1952]
1 S.C.R. 232, at 257 (S.C.C.)).
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Id., at 336.
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Id., at 335-36.
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McNeil, the Court further expanded the penumbra of full answer and
defence and held that under the Stinchcombe disclosure regime, the Crown
had a good-faith duty to inquire as to whether any other law enforcement
agency, such as the police, possessed information that was potentially
relevant to the Crown’s case or the accused’s defence.66
The right to cross-examination is also located in the penumbra of
section 11(d) and the section 7 right to make full answer and defence.67
In R. v. Lyttle, the Supreme Court held that the penumbra of this right
extended to “the right of an accused to cross-examine witnesses for the
prosecution without significant and unwarranted constraint”.68
The penumbra theory also explains the principles of fundamental
justice that govern jury selection. The common law protected the right to
an impartial jury. This right had been constitutionalized under section 11(f)
of the Charter, which guaranteed the right to a jury trial where the
maximum punishment for an offence exceeds five years’ imprisonment.
In R. v. Sherratt, the Court held that the section 11(f) right to a jury must
be understood with reference to the section 11(d) right to a fair trial.69
Jury selection should be driven by the “fundamental rights to a fair trial
by an impartial jury and to equality before and under the law”.70 As a
corollary, juries must be representative of the community.71
The penumbra of this right to a fair, impartial and representative jury,
required modification of the common law and statutory rules regarding
jury selection. At common law and in the Criminal Code,72 the Crown
and the accused were not on equal footing when it came to the number of
prospective jurors they could dismiss without cause during jury selection.
Under the Criminal Code’s rules, the Crown could ask up to 48 prospective jurors to “stand by” in the jury selection process. The stand-by was a
tool of long-standing historical precedent, dating back to the 1300s.73
These stand-bys provided by the Criminal Code were in addition to the
four peremptory challenges permitted to the Crown, giving the Crown a
4.25-1 numerical advantage in excusing prospective jurors. In R. v.
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R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, at paras. 48-51 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at 665 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Lyttle, [2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, at para. 1 (S.C.C.).
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Bain,74 the accused challenged the stand-by provisions of the Criminal
Code. Although the Crown’s numerical advantage was prescribed by law
and had long been a part of the common law, the majority of the Court
held that “the overwhelming numerical superiority of choice granted to
the Crown creates a pervasive air of unfairness in the jury selection procedure”.75 There was no specific right in the Charter that required parity
between the Crown and the accused when it came to jury selection. But
this inequality was incompatible with the right to an impartial and representative jury protected by the penumbra of sections 7, 11(d) and 11(f) of
the Charter.
There are arguably examples where it is difficult to discern whether a
section 7 principle of fundamental justice is properly categorized as belonging to the penumbra or whether it is a historical principle. The right
to Stinchcombe disclosure is one such example. On one hand, the fact
that prosecutors had “generally cooperated in making disclosure available” gave rise to an argument that the common law required Crown
disclosure. Justice Sopinka, however, held that “the law with respect to
the duty of the Crown to disclose is not settled”.76 To the extent that any
right to Crown disclosure existed at common law, there was likely insufficient evidence in the historical record to show that it was protected as a
fundamental right. Accordingly, it is properly categorized within the penumbra of section 7 and the right to make full answer and defence. Still,
it is worth noting that these categories are not watertight compartments,
but rather useful ways of organizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s
methodologies in its section 7 decisions.
As “gap-fillers”, the penumbra principles of fundamental justice share
some similarities with “unwritten constitutional principles”.77 Granted, all
section 7 principles of fundamental justice that are not enumerated in
sections 8 to 14 are “unwritten” in addition to being “constitutional
principles”. Yet, the penumbra principles of fundamental justice in
section 7 are conceptually distinct from the unwritten constitutional
principles (as that term is normally understood). Although a detailed
examination of the relationship between these concepts is beyond the
scope of this article, it is important that they not be conflated. Both the
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[1992] S.C.J. No. 3, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91, at 103 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 103, per Cory J.
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Stinchcombe, supra, note 28, at 331.
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See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217,
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penumbra principles of fundamental justice and the unwritten
constitutional principles function as “gap fillers”, but the size of the gaps
they fill differs. Whereas the penumbra principles fill the gaps in the
interstitia between sections 7 and 14 of the Charter, the unwritten
constitutional principles involve overarching “vital unstated assumptions”
and “organizing principles” that animate the entire written text of the
Constitution and our legal system.78 The penumbra principles involve
ensuring that existing legal rights protected under sections 7 to 14 are not
undermined by gaps in the constitutional framework and thus are
anchored in the text. Unwritten constitutional principles — like the “rule
of law”79 or “independence of the judiciary”80 — are foundational and
might not be moored to the text of the Constitution at all.81
(b) The Waning Penumbra
The penumbra mode of reasoning was a mainstay of the Court’s
early section 7 jurisprudence. It is lamentable, however, that the Court
did not explicitly acknowledge it. Justices of the Supreme Court come
and go, and unspoken but implicit rules and doctrines retire along with
their proponents. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that although the
penumbra approach led to an explosion of newly recognized section 7
rights during the 1990s, its use has receded in recent years, sometimes
depriving litigants of their best arguments. The Supreme Court’s decisions
in R. v. Singh and R. v. Sinclair are useful examples.82
Mr. Singh was charged with first degree murder. After consulting
with counsel, he advised the police that he did not wish to make a statement. The police persisted in attempting to question Mr. Singh despite
his 18 declarations that he wished to remain silent. Eventually, Mr. Singh
gave an incriminating statement. In a 5-4 decision, the majority of the
Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the right to silence.
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Id., at paras. 49, 53.
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While Mr. Singh had a right to silence, the police were not precluded
from trying to persuade him to waive that right, provided that their tactics did not cause Mr. Singh’s will to be overborne.83
Justice Fish, writing for the four dissenting justices, held that the
police “unfairly frustrated [Mr. Singh’s] decision on the question of
whether to make a statement to the authorities”.84 His reasoning evoked
the section 7 penumbra: The police’s denigration of counsel’s advice and
failure to respect Mr. Singh’s right to silence “collaterally” infringed
Mr. Singh’s right to counsel.85 For the right to silence and right to
counsel to be meaningful, the police must be under a corollary duty to
respect the invocation of that right. Justice Fish’s decision is
conceptually consistent with the penumbra approaches of the 1990s, but
by 2006 when Singh was decided, that approach was a dissenting one.86
Sinclair followed a similar pattern. Mr. Sinclair was arrested and
detained. He was advised of his right to counsel and right to silence. He
exercised his right to counsel (speaking to counsel twice) and repeatedly
maintained that he did not want to speak to the police. He also asked if
his counsel could be present during the interrogation. The police
succeeded in eventually convincing Mr. Sinclair to speak with them and
he eventually incriminated himself in a murder plot. He argued that the
police had infringed his Charter rights on the basis that rights protected
under section 10(b) and section 7 of the Charter afforded him not just the
right to counsel but the right to meaningful assistance, which includes the
right to have counsel present during an in-custody interrogation. By a 6-3
majority, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.87
In many ways, Sinclair ought to have been a paradigmatic penumbra
case. The purpose of the penumbra principles of fundamental justice is to
ensure that core rights protected by established principles of fundamental
justice are not undermined by gaps in our constitutional framework.
A panoply of principles of fundamental justice protected Mr. Sinclair: the
right to silence, the right against self-incrimination and the presumption
of innocence all work together to ensure that suspects are never obligated
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to participate in building the case against them.88 The right to counsel
ensures that the accused is made aware of his rights and how to effectively exercise them,89 and above all, is “treated fairly in the criminal
process”.90 Sinclair had properly invoked his constitutional rights. But by
waiting until after the accused had spoken to counsel and by ignoring
Sinclair’s right to silence (which was permitted by the Court’s holding in
Singh), the police undermined those constitutional safeguards. As Binnie J.
pointed out in dissent,91 the police had succeeded in rendering Sinclair’s
counsel as effective as a telephone answering service providing two
minutes of pre-recorded legal advice. The penumbra principles of fundamental justice exist to avoid such absurd outcomes. As the Sinclair
dissent explained, a robust right to counsel, which protected the right to
have counsel present during an interrogation, would have bridged the gap
in the constitutional framework.92
Despite Singh and Sinclair, the penumbra theory remains a
conceptually attractive, middle-of-the-road approach to the principles of
fundamental justice. Although the penumbra theory is broader than the
historical approach, it is not indeterminate. Penumbra principles of
fundamental justice are derivative of pre-existing rights found in the
common law and in the Charter’s enumerated provisions. The penumbra
theory thus strikes the appropriate balance between a conception of section 7
that is frozen in 1982 and an approach so broad that it is indeterminate.
Still, even at its highest, the penumbra theory may be unduly restrictive.
Justice Lamer moored the penumbra of section 7 to the “Legal Rights”
contained in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter, and in so doing, expressly
excluded from the penumbra the fundamental freedoms (section 2),
democratic rights (sections 3-4), mobility rights (section 6) and equality
rights (section 15) guaranteed by the Charter.93 Subsequent case law
appears to have followed suit. In C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and
Family Services),94 the Court rejected the rights-holder’s claim that her right
to religious freedom under section 2(a) augmented her section 7 right to be
Id., at 156-59, per LeBel and Fish JJ., dissenting.
R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, at 1242-43 (S.C.C.).
90
R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at 191 (S.C.C.).
91
Sinclair, supra, note 82, at para. 86, per Binnie J., dissenting.
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Id., at paras. 124-130, per Fish and LeBel JJ., dissenting.
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free from state interference with a decision to refuse a blood transfusion.
Similarly, in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)95 and Charkaoui v.
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),96 cases in which the section 15(1)
equality claim appeared to dovetail with the section 7 claims, the Court kept
the section 15(1) and section 7 analyses distinct, not permitting the equality
dimension of the claim to permeate the section 7 analysis.
Gosselin involved a Charter challenge to Quebec’s social assistance
scheme, which set the base amount of welfare payable to persons under
the age of 30 at roughly one third of the base amount payable to those 30
and over. The scheme was challenged under both section 7 and section 15(1)
of the Charter. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, in dissent, would have recognized
a penumbra emanating from section 7 and section 15, holding that
interpretations of section 15 can inform section 7 and vice versa.97 The
majority, however, rejected the idea of a section 7/section 15 penumbra,
holding that section 7 — like the other legal rights — required a nexus to
the administration of justice. Section 15 did not require such a nexus,
making the two sections analytically separate.98
Charkaoui provides a good example where, if anywhere, a
section 7/section 15 penumbra was ripe for recognition. In Charkaoui, the
appellants challenged the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’s
security certificate scheme, which permitted the Minister to authorize the
lengthy, if not indefinite, detention of the person named in the security
certificate on the basis of reasonable grounds that the named person was a
national security threat. The scheme applied only to non-citizens. The
spectre of lengthy, indeterminate or indefinite detention, coupled with the
differential treatment of non-citizens, triggered both section 7 and
section 15 of the Charter. Because membership in a disadvantaged,
discrete and insular group (non-citizens) was the impetus for a serious
deprivation of liberty (indefinite detention) under the scheme, Charkaoui
was an appropriate case in which to recognize the penumbra between
section 7 and section 15 of the Charter.
Indeed, this is precisely how a majority of the British House of Lords
analyzed a similar legislative scheme under the United Kingdom’s
Terrorism Act 2000.99 In the majority of the Law Lords’ analyses, the
95
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equality and the liberty claims were conceptually fused. As Lord Nichols
pointedly observed, “it is difficult to see how the extreme circumstances,
which alone would justify such [prolonged or indefinite] detention, can
exist when lesser protective steps apparently suffice in the case of British
citizens suspected of being international terrorists”.100 The arbitrariness
of using citizenship as a proxy for dangerousness rendered the legislation
both overbroad and underbroad by “leaving British suspected terrorists at
large … while imposing the severe penalty of indefinite detention on
[foreign nationals]”.101 On this basis, the House of Lords declared the
legislation to be incompatible with the U.K.’s international treaty
obligations under the European Human Rights Convention.
Despite this precedent, the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui
kept the liberty and equality claims analytically distinct, analyzing
section 7 issues without regard to the differential treatment of
non-citizens and then going on to dismiss the section 15 claim in a terse
four paragraphs.102 In both Gosselin and Charkaoui, the inevitable effect
of compartmentalizing the respective section 7 and section 15 claims was
to weaken both arguments.
Other than the need to restrain the reach of section 7, it is unclear
whether there is a sound doctrinal reason as to why the penumbra of the
principles of fundamental justice should be limited to sections 7 to 14 of
the Charter. Some commentators and jurists justify such a limit on the
ground that section 7 and sections 8 to 14 fall under the “Legal Rights”
heading of the Charter,103 and therefore, their application is limited to
contexts in which the “administration of justice” or an “adjudicative
setting” is engaged. The Supreme Court’s early decisions on section 7
appeared to give effect to this idea and suggested that section 7 applied
only to deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person “that occur
as a result of an individual’s interaction with the justice system and its
administration”.104 However, the Court later held that a nexus with the
administration of justice may not be necessary to trigger section 7.105 If a
100
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nexus to the administration of justice is not necessary to trigger section 7,
then the penumbra of section 7 should not be limited to “Legal Rights”
(sections 7 to 14) but should apply more broadly to other Charter provisions.
3. Principles of Fundamental Justice Based on Evolving Societal
Values
Not all principles of fundamental justice that fall outside of the
historical category can be explained by the penumbra theory. A third
theory of the principles of fundamental justice — “founded upon the
belief in the dignity and worth of the human person” and “on the rule of
law”106 — has emerged in the case law. This theory is the most expansive
and thus potentially the most indeterminate. Principles of fundamental
justice rooted in this theory are recognized where a section 7 right to life,
liberty or security of the person outweighs a competing government
interest. These principles of fundamental justice protect an evolving set
of national values, which command widespread contemporary support, as
reflected in legal developments and societal understandings that may
change over time.
Saying that this third theory is founded upon human dignity is not to
suggest that human dignity is unimportant under the first two theories.
Respect for the inherent human dignity of all people is arguably the
animating principle behind all Charter rights.107 The difference is that
under the first two theories, the principle of fundamental justice is
anchored in precedent or is closely connected to pre-existing principles
through the penumbra. Under this third theory, respect for human dignity
and individual autonomy drives the analysis.
(a) The Expansive Era of the Evolving Rights Theory
R. v. Vaillancourt and R. v. Martineau are early examples of this
evolving rights approach to the principles of fundamental justice.108 Both
cases involved challenges to the “constructive murder” provisions of the
106
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Criminal Code. Ordinarily, murder requires proof of some kind of subjective
intent to cause the death of the victim, as reflected in section 229(a) of the
Criminal Code. The provisions challenged in Vaillancourt and Martineau
defined homicide as murder in certain circumstances (such as when death
was caused “while committing or attempting to commit” one of several
enumerated offences) regardless of whether the Crown could prove the
subjective mental state. In Vaillancourt, the Supreme Court held that this
“relaxation” of the mens rea element of murder offended the principles
of fundamental justice.109
While Lamer J., writing for the majority, relied on the section 7 right
to be presumed innocent and the principle that criminal offences must
contain a fault element,110 it is a stretch to say that the Vaillancourt/
Martineau principles can be found in the penumbra of section 7. It is one
thing to say that a criminal offence must contain a fault element; it is
something different to say that Parliament cannot reduce the degree of
fault necessary for a particular offence. Further, Vaillancourt and
Martineau represented a clear break with a common law tradition. The
concepts of “constructive murder” or “felony murder” had lengthy
histories in the criminal law of Canada, the United States, Britain and
other Commonwealth countries.111 The reasoning in these cases is driven
by an evolving rights theory focused on human dignity. The Court was
concerned that those convicted of constructive murder would unduly
suffer the “stigma” and the severe punishment reserved for the most
serious offenders. As Lamer C.J.C. wrote, “in a free and democratic
society that values the autonomy and free will of the individual, the
stigma and punishment attaching to the most serious of crimes, murder,
should be reserved for those who choose to intentionally cause death or
who choose to inflict bodily harm that they know is likely to cause
death”.112 The Court’s holdings in Vaillancourt and Martineau are rooted
in the idea that the Constitution protects the human dignity of all
individuals, including those convicted of serious offences.113
R. v. Morgentaler is an important case in the development of the
evolutionary approach to the principles of fundamental justice.114
109
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In Morgentaler, the Court famously struck down the Criminal Code’s
abortion scheme. Chief Justice Dickson found that the legal abortion
scheme was characterized by excessive delay and that because of
byzantine procedures, access to therapeutic abortions was illusory.115
He concluded that this scheme violated the woman’s right to security of
the person in a manner that offended the principles of fundamental
justice because the Code’s abortion scheme was “manifestly unfair”.116
Justice Beetz’s decision was narrower than that of the Chief Justice but
he ultimately also found that the Code’s therapeutic abortion
requirements were “manifestly unfair”.117
Neither Chief Justice Dickson nor Beetz J. provides any authority for
the proposition that a “manifestly unfair” law offends the principles of
fundamental justice. The principle that laws should not be “manifestly
unfair” cannot be traced to our common law heritage, nor does this
principle fit within the penumbra of section 7. Nevertheless, these
opinions represent important building blocks in developing the principle
that laws must not be arbitrary, overbroad or grossly disproportionate
infringements of life, liberty or security of the person (see infra, at 368-73).
Justice Wilson’s concurring opinion was not grounded in the
“manifest unfairness” of the abortion procedure. She affirmed a new
principle of fundamental justice, anchored in human dignity and
autonomy, which serves to protect a woman’s substantive right to
terminate her pregnancy, free from state interference.118 This opinion is
the high watermark in our third theory of the principles of fundamental
justice, which focuses on evolving societal values and normative
judgments about what rights, interests and values should be protected in
a free and democratic society.
(b) The Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine Test
Morgentaler was a watershed moment in part because it recognized
principles rooted neither in pre-Charter law nor in the section 7 penumbra.
But the Court discovered early on that this third approach was potentially
limitless. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General),119 the Court
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erected strictures around the evolving rights theory to guard against this risk
of indeterminacy. Ms. Rodriguez, who suffered from amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis and whose condition was rapidly deteriorating, had applied for a
court order that section 241(b) of the Criminal Code, which prohibits
physician-assisted suicide, violated her Charter rights. The appellant argued
that it is a principle of fundamental justice that the human dignity and
autonomy of individuals be respected, and that to subject her to needless
suffering is to rob her of that dignity. A majority of the Court rejected her
claim. Justice Sopinka held that it was “unquestioned” that “respect for
human dignity is one of the underlying principles upon which our society is
based”.120 However, human dignity was not a free-standing principle of
fundamental justice.121
In so holding, the majority adopted the following framework to identify the principles of fundamental justice:
… A mere common law rule does not suffice to constitute a
principle of fundamental justice, rather, as the term implies,
principles upon which there is some consensus that they are vital or
fundamental to our societal notion of justice are required. Principles
of fundamental justice must not, however, be so broad as to be no
more than vague generalizations about what our society considers to
be ethical or moral. They must be capable of being identified with
some precision and applied to situations in a manner which yields
an understandable result. They must also, in my view, be legal
principles.122

In R. v. Malmo-Levine, and in cases following it, the Supreme Court
restated this framework from Rodriguez as a three-part test, requiring the
rights-holder to establish the following before a court will recognize a
principle of fundamental justice:
(1) there is a legal principle;
(2) there is a societal consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental
to the way in which the legal system ought to fairly operate; and
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(3) the principle is capable of being identified with sufficient precision
so as to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person.123
The purpose of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test was to prevent
the principles of fundamental justice under the evolving rights
theory from becoming limitless. Still, even with the adoption of the
Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, indeterminacy and unpredictability
persist, as it remains necessary to identify whether the proposed
“principle” was in fact a “legal principle”. Further, as commentators have
noted, determining whether there is “sufficient consensus” that a
principle is “fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought to
fairly operate” is even more difficult to understand and apply.124
Owing to these difficulties, the recognition of new principles of fundamental justice under the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test has been
relatively rare.125 The test is set up for failure. Indeed, where the Court
has wanted to recognize a right under the evolving rights theory, it has
tended to bypass the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test altogether in favour
of a more flexible approach. For example, in United States v. Burns
(which pre-dates Malmo-Levine but was decided after Rodriguez), the
Supreme Court held that the extradition of an accused to a death penalty
jurisdiction would violate the principles of fundamental justice unless
Canada received assurances that prosecutors would not seek the death
penalty.126 This holding was not anchored in history or in the section 7
penumbra or justified under the methodology from Rodriguez. Rather, it
was based on policy considerations that took into account evolving standards of decency and the collective abhorrence toward the death penalty
in Canada and in other democratic nations.127
The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. D. (B.)128 stands out as an
exception in which the application of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test
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has led to the recognition of a new principle of fundamental justice under
the evolving rights approach. In R. v. D. (B.), the Court considered the
constitutionality of a reverse onus provision of the Youth Criminal
Justice Act (“YCJA”).129 Justice Abella, writing for the majority,
recognized a new principle of fundamental justice that young persons
were entitled to a “presumption of diminished moral culpability” and
struck down the provision.130 Yet, the majority’s conclusion that there is a
societal consensus that this principle is fundamental to our legal system
was based less on democratic consensus and more on the majority’s
reasoned judgment — taking into account the purposes of the YCJA,
international human rights norms, and scientific literature about the
cognitive development of adolescents — that young persons are less
morally blameworthy than adults.131
The majority and dissenting opinions in D. (B.) show that there
remains considerable confusion surrounding the Rodriguez/MalmoLevine test, particularly as it relates to the second prong — i.e., a societal
consensus that the rule or principle is fundamental to the way in which
the legal system ought to fairly operate. The 5-4 majority in D. (B.)
understood “societal consensus” to mean what the reasonable person —
fully informed about our legal system and history and the evolving
consensus in democratic legal systems around the world and in
international law — would believe is fundamental to the way in which
the legal system ought to fairly operate. By contrast, Rothstein J., writing
for the dissent, took “societal consensus” to mean popular opinion in
Canada. He wrote that there was “no societal consensus that such a
presumption [of diminished moral blameworthiness and youth sentences]
is a vital component of our notion of justice”.132 This conclusion was
based on “[s]tudies on public perceptions of youth crime”, which
suggested that “the prevailing views of the public are that youth crime is
rising, particularly violent youth crime, and that young offenders are
handled too leniently by youth justice courts”.133 Justice Rothstein went
on to consider the ebb and flow of youth criminal justice from a
historical perspective and the perceived public concern with youth
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violence, which led to successive changes to the Young Offenders Act and
its eventual repeal in favour of the YCJA.134
The majority and the dissent in D. (B.) speak past each other. Both
purport to be applying the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, but apply
starkly different versions of the “societal consensus” prong of the test.
Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. On one hand, the plain meaning
of the term “societal consensus” would suggest popular opinion as
reflected in the dissenting approach. On the other hand, how does the
majority of Canadian society (most of whom are non-lawyers) know
what is and isn’t a fundamental legal principle? It is doubtful that the vast
majority of our non-lawyer population has even heard of many of
those principles that are well entrenched as section 7 principles of
fundamental justice. The notion that there is a true democratic
“consensus” that these principles are fundamental to our legal system is a
legal fiction. Moreover, the notion that popular opinion should determine
the content of a constitutional right is oxymoronic. As Lamer J. has
noted, “[t]he Charter is designed to protect the accused from the
majority, so the enforcement of the Charter must not be left to that
majority”.135 From this perspective, an approach to “societal consensus”
based on what the enlightened, reasonable person would believe is the
more workable standard.
Given the relatively few cases in which new principles of fundamental justice are recognized under the evolving rights theory, it is difficult to
speculate as to which conception of “societal consensus” will prevail.
But a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal suggests
support for the enlightened, reasonable person approach. In Federation
of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General),136 the Federation challenged certain Regulations made under the Proceeds of Crime
(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act,137 which required
lawyers in certain circumstances, who receive or pay funds on behalf of
clients, to keep records of financial transactions. That information can
then be accessed by Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre
of Canada (“FINTRAC”) and law enforcement agencies. The chambers
judge found that this regime engaged the liberty interests of clients and
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lawyers alike in a manner that was inconsistent with the principles of
fundamental justice because “the impugned provisions infringe the solicitor-client relationship insofar as they provide that lawyers are required
to obtain and retain information about their clients which can be accessed
by FINTRAC and provided to law enforcement agencies”, thereby turning lawyers’ offices “into archives for the use of the prosecution”.138
The B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge’s decision but
on different grounds. While solicitor-client privilege was of course a
principle of fundamental justice, it was not directly engaged by this
legislation. The Court held instead that the regime violated the principle
of the “independence of the Bar”. The Court of Appeal acknowledged
that this principle was not a “settled principle of fundamental justice” but
applied the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine framework and concluded that it
was “fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought fairly to
operate”.139 The Court gave no pretense of searching for a “societal
consensus”, but instead focused on the strong language from Supreme
Court of Canada precedents and a treatise on The Rule of Law that extols
the virtues of an Independent Bar.140 It will be interesting to see whether
the Supreme Court adopts the Court of Appeal’s approach, particularly
because the independence of the Bar may be more appropriately
categorized as an unwritten constitutional principle (see supra, at 355-56)
rather than a principle of fundamental justice under section 7.141
(c) The Proportionality Triumvirate
Due in part to the difficulty of establishing new principles under the
Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test, evolving rights theory cases have tended in
recent years to coalesce around a set of principles of fundamental justice
rooted in the concept of proportionality: overbreadth, arbitrariness
and gross disproportionality (the “proportionality triumvirate”). A law
is “arbitrary” if it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the
state interest that lies behind the legislation.142 A law is “grossly
disproportionate” if the state action or legislative response to a problem is
138
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so extreme as to be disproportionate to any legitimate government
interest.143 A law is “overbroad” if the means chosen by the State to
achieve an objective “are broader than necessary to accomplish that
objective”.144 The concepts of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross
disproportionality closely resemble the three aspects of proportionality in
the section 1 Oakes test: arbitrariness is analogous to “rational
connection”; overbreadth is analogous to “minimal impairment”; and gross
disproportionality is analogous to the weighing of salutary versus
deleterious effects.145 The proportionality triumvirate’s similarity to the
Oakes test may explain why courts have been receptive to it and why
litigants invoking the proportionality triumvirate have achieved some
success in recent cases.
The proportionality triumvirate differs from early approaches to the
evolving rights theory by focusing on the means that the government has
chosen rather than the ends. Courts are not drawn into making normative
value determinations about the merits of government policy (e.g., is it
good policy to protect a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy?) but
are instead asked to determine whether the government has pursued its
policy in a proportionate manner (e.g., is the legislation governing abortions fair or arbitrary?). The proportionality triumvirate serves the
function of the evolving rights theory by expanding section 7 beyond
historically protected rights and their penumbras, but answers the charge
of indeterminacy by focusing on the means rather than the ends.
The origins of the proportionality triumvirate are unclear. They are
not historical. As noted above, prior to 1982, there was no prohibition
preventing Parliament or the legislature from passing laws that were
disproportionate to the life, liberty or security interests affected by the
legislation. Nor is the principle of proportionate law-making derived
from the section 7 penumbra because the section 7 penumbra requires a
close connection to a pre-existing principle. To the extent that the
proportionality triumvirate fits into any of our categories, it belongs in
the category of evolving rights based on concepts of human dignity and
143
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individual autonomy, having first emerged in Morgentaler under the
rubric of “manifest unfairness”.146
Although the Court’s section 7 jurisprudence does not explicitly
draw the connection between human dignity and proportionality, that
connection is explained in the section 1 context in R. v. Oakes. In explaining the rationale behind the section 1 proportionality (“Oakes”) test,
Dickson C.J.C. explained that:
… The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a
free and democratic society which I believe embody, to name but a
few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment
to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of
beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society. The underlying values and principles of a free
and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a
limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be
reasonable and demonstrably justified.147

Section 7’s proportionality triumvirate should be understood in a
similar vein. In the post-Charter era, as citizens grew from subjects into
constitutionally protected rights-holders, the Constitution now demands
that the Government treat the people as ends rather than means. Accordingly, government law-making that trenches upon life, liberty or the
security of the person must be proportionate to the ends sought.
Efforts to fit section 7 claims within the proportionality triumvirate
have yielded some success. In Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), a
4-3 majority struck down Quebec’s prohibition on private insurance for
health care services as incompatible with the Quebec Charter.148 Three
members of the majority held that the prohibition was arbitrary and thus
a violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter because its purpose (the
protection of the public health care system) bore no relation to the means
chosen (a prohibition on private insurance).149
In Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society,150
the applicants challenged the Minister of Health’s decision to withdraw an
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exemption that had been awarded to Insite, a “safe injection site”, under a
statutory discretion. Insite provided clean needles and a safe environment
for users of unlawful intravenous drugs, with a view to preventing the
spread of infectious disease caused by re-use of needles and to providing
health care for drug users. The evidence in the record showed that Insite
had reduced the injection of drugs in public as well as the number of
overdose deaths. Further, there was no evidence that Insite had increased
the rate of crime. In light of the evidence, the decision to refuse to continue
Insite’s exemption was arbitrary because the exemption “does not
undermine the objectives of public health and safety, but furthers them”.151
The Minister’s action was also grossly disproportionate in its effects.
Insite’s benefits were proven; it saved lives. On the other hand, the benefit
that the government might achieve from denying the exemption was
speculative.152
Chaoulli and PHS are remarkable for a number of reasons (some of
which are discussed by my colleagues in this volume).153 But they are
also remarkable because of what they tell us about the trajectory of the
evolving rights category of section 7 principles of fundamental justice.
The evolving rights approach has moved from an individual-centric
mode of analysis, rooted in human dignity, to a state-centric mode of
analysis, which focuses on whether the Government has engaged in proportionate law-making. The section 7 claims in Chaoulli and PHS were
framed as challenges to government conduct: i.e., that the government
had acted unlawfully by enacting overbroad, arbitrary and grossly disproportionate laws. In the early (pre-Rodriguez) days of the evolving
rights theory, those claims might have been framed as positive rights
claims. In an earlier time, the Chaoulli applicants might have focused on
establishing that the prohibition on private health insurance interfered
with their right to choose how to access health care — a choice that is
tied intimately to human dignity and self-fulfilment. Meanwhile, in PHS,
the claim could have focused on how the government’s conduct interfered
with the applicant’s right of access to safe conditions, an idea rooted in
the belief that drug users are also deserving of respect and that safe injection sites are an important means of protecting them from harm and
preserving their human dignity. Such claims would have been similar to
151
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other early evolving rights approaches, such as Wilson J.’s concurrence
in Morgentaler and the dissent in Rodriguez. But in more recent years,
particularly after the entrenchment of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine test,
courts have been unreceptive to these affirmative claims grounded explicitly in human dignity. They have instead found claims couched as
challenges to government’s overbroad, arbitrary or grossly disproportionate laws to be more palatable.
Two “do-over” Charter challenges — Bedford v. Canada154 and
Carter v. Canada155 — underscore this point. In Bedford, the applicants
challenged the constitutionality of three provisions of the Criminal Code
— the bawdy-house prohibition, the “living-off-the-avails” prohibition
and the public solicitation prohibition — that formed the core of
Parliament’s response to prostitution.156 These were the same sections
challenged in the 1988 Prostitution Reference.157 In the Prostitution
Reference, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the
Charter challenge.158 The Prostitution Reference arguments in favour of
striking down the impugned provisions were grounded in the sex
worker’s right to freedom of expression and the section 7 principle of
fundamental justice against vague laws. A majority of the Supreme Court
rejected those claims.159 The Bedford applicants took those arguments
and recast them as arguments about proportionate law-making, arguing
that the impugned provisions were overbroad, arbitrary and grossly
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disproportionate in relation to the ends sought to be achieved through the
legislation.160 Notwithstanding the Prostitution Reference precedent, the
Ontario Court of Appeal agreed in part with the application judge and
held that both the bawdy house and living-off-the-avails provisions were
overbroad and grossly disproportionate.161
The British Columbia Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. Canada
is another effective illustration of the move from a human dignity-centric
approach to a state-centric approach grounded in the proportionality triumvirate. Carter is in many respects a do-over of Rodriguez, challenging
the Criminal Code prohibition on assisted suicide. But whereas the applicant in Rodriguez grounded her Charter claim in an explicit appeal to
respect human dignity, the applicant in Carter reframed those arguments
as claims based in the proportionality triumvirate of the principles of
fundamental justice.162 Notwithstanding Rodriguez, the British Columbia
Supreme Court agreed that the impugned provision was overbroad and
grossly disproportionate to the ends sought.163 The British Columbia
Court of Appeal recently reversed that decision,164 but a forceful dissent
from Finch C.J.B.C., and the ongoing public controversy surrounding
assisted suicide, suggest that the Supreme Court of Canada is likely to
have the final word in this case.
Scholars of constitutional law have approached the proportionality
triumvirate with some suspicion.165 Their concerns are not entirely
unfounded. While Lamer J. had an expansive vision of the principles of
fundamental justice, even he cautiously emphasized that the principles of
fundamental justice must not intrude into the realm of “policy matters”.166
The argument that the courts applying the proportionality triumvirate are
not second-guessing Parliament’s policy choices but rather measuring their
means is only a partial response. As Bedford and Carter show, section 7
challenges that previously called on the courts to recognize new positive
section 7 rights can often be reformulated as claims grounded in
proportionality. The courts’ task will be to separate those genuine
proportionality-based challenges from those that merely seek to secondguess the government’s policy decisions. On balance, however, the
160
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162
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164
165
166

Bedford, supra, note 154, at paras. 198-212.
Id., at paras. 204-213, 243-256.
Carter, supra, note 155, at paras. 974-985.
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emergence of the proportionality triumvirate is a welcome development to
the evolutionary approach to the principles of fundamental justice, which
had been rudderless since Rodriguez.

III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Canada has never expressly adopted any of the
three theories discussed above, but each has figured prominently in the
Court’s reasoning throughout the Charter era. Although each of these three
theories is consistent with the Charter’s transformative purpose, each also
serves a different function. The historical theory posits that the purpose of
section 7 is to ensure that the enumeration of certain rights in the text of
the Charter does not foreclose the recognition of other principles that have
historically been fundamental to the way our legal system operates. The
penumbra theory is based on a similar purpose but is more expansive. It
posits that reliance solely on the historical approach is inconsistent with
the living tree Constitution that our courts have so assiduously watered and
would leave gaps in our constitutional framework. The penumbra theory
thus serves a gap-filling function, recognizing new principles of
fundamental justice where those new principles are necessary to breathe
life and meaning into existing principles. The evolving rights theory posits
that section 7 — like the Charter more generally — serves primarily to
ensure that the state respects individual human dignity and autonomy. Under
this theory, the principles of fundamental justice must be moored to their
primary purpose: protecting the human dignity of Canadian citizens. While
the evolving rights theory in more recent years has coalesced around the
proportionality triumvirate of arbitrariness, overbreadth and proportionality,
these principles remain rooted in the concept of human dignity.
The purpose of this paper was not to endorse any one of these theories, but rather to identify them so that they may be helpful to future
litigants. Understanding the animating principles behind section 7 is necessary to marshal purposive, principled arguments, especially where the
rights-holder seeks recognition of a new section 7 principle of fundamental justice. Each of these theories can serve rights-holders’ interests when
invoked in the appropriate context.
Rights claimants should not overlook the historical principles of fundamental justice. While this category is limited because it depends on
anchoring the principle in pre-Charter precedent, there is an obvious advantage if the rights claimant can ground her claim in the historically
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based principles of fundamental justice: proof of the right’s existence
requires only identifying a historical precedent. Further, as in the cases
described above, where a principle of fundamental justice is historically
based, the rights-holder may be entitled to a more robust remedy.
The penumbra theory is also a useful tool to litigants because it empowers litigants to assert new rights while still being soundly anchored in
established principles. It was invoked frequently during the 1990s. However, the failure of the Supreme Court in its early years to more explicitly
endorse the penumbra theory may have led to some lost opportunities for
meritorious rights claimants. In cases such as Singh and Sinclair, which
fit nicely within the penumbra framework, the penumbra mode of analysis was non-existent in the majority’s opinion. If the penumbra theory
had been expressly endorsed in the Court’s earlier jurisprudence, those
Charter challenges might have succeeded. Still, the penumbra theory remains promising — particularly in the criminal procedure context where
it has been most frequently invoked — because it occupies a conceptual
middle ground: it is dynamic and flexible enough to allow new, previously unrecognized principles of fundamental justice to emerge but also
sufficiently anchored to the text of sections 7 to 14 of the Charter to
avoid the critics’ charge that section 7 after MVR took a vague, indeterminate and unprincipled turn.
The third approach, based on notions of evolving rights and societal
values, was originally the most expansive approach to the principles of
fundamental justice. The introduction of the Rodriguez/Malmo-Levine
test has substantially limited the recognition of new principles of fundamental justice under this theory. It is hard to see a return to the expansive
evolving rights approach that we saw in Vaillancourt and Martineau and
the Rodriguez and Gosselin dissents. In recent years, rights claimants in this
third category have relied on the proportionality triumvirate — arbitrariness,
gross disproportionality and overbreadth. In light of the Court’s recent
decisions in Chaoulli and PHS, and the recent successes in the lower
courts in Bedford and Carter, litigants seeking recognition of rights
rooted neither in historical precedent nor the section 7 penumbra would
be well-advised to focus their efforts on fitting their section 7 Charter
challenges within the proportionality triumvirate, which appear robust
enough to accommodate diverse rights claims.

